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Review Essays

INCULCATING CONSTITUTIONAL
VALUES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Gerald Gunther &
Kathleen M. Sullivan. Westbury, New York: Foundation
Press. 13th edition, 1997. Pp. xciii, 1553. Cloth, $55.95.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis
M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, & Mark V. Tushnet.
Boston: Aspen Law and Business Education. 3d Edition,
1996. Pp. ciii, 1814. Cloth, $60.00.
William K. Kelley*

The two leading casebooks on Constitutional Law1 -one an
acknowledged classic and the other fast on its way to becoming
one-were recently released in new editions at a time when the
challenges facing casebook authors seem greater than ever. Despite the Supreme Court's diminishing docket, its continuing
output of significant constitutional cases remains breathtaking in
number and scope. The Court's work runs the gamut from refining the fine points of the latest compelled speech dispute in
first amendment law, 2 to determining whether the dormant
commerce clause bars a State from giving preferred treatment to

• Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. I thank Gerard V.
Bradley, John H. Garvey, John F. Manning, Michael Stokes Paulsen, and Patrick J.
Schiltz for helpful comments on a prior draft, and Stephen Griesemer for able research
assistance.
1. Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Law (Foundation
Press, 13th ed. 1997) ("Gunther & Sullivan"); Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional
Law (Aspen Law and Business Education, 3d ed. 1996)("Stone").
2 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S.
Ct. 2338 (1995).
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in-state charitable institutions. 3 And while it continues its yearly
work of adding layers of nuance to doctrine in established areas,
the Court in recent years has decided a series of cases that break
significant new ground, particularly in the areas of federalism,
racial preferences, and voting rights. 4 It is no small task to produce a new edition of an established book that maintains the
breadth and depth of coverage of prior editions, while simultaneously taking account of what might well tum out to be sea
changes in particular areas, and to do so while also conveying a
coherent and complete picture of constitutional jurisprudence.
Two books that continue to strike that balance are the third
edition of Constitutional Law, by Geoffrey Stone, Louis Seidman, Cass Sunstein and Mark Tushnet, and the thirteenth edition of Gerald Gunther's Constitutional Law, which Kathleen
Sullivan has joined as a co-author. Given the fame each of these
authors has attained for his or her prior contributions to constitutional law scholarship, and the obvious prominence of prior
editions of these casebooks, it is inevitable that the new editions
will be widely used in law schools across the country. Thousands of law students will therefore have their conception of
constitutional law shaped by the composition and editorial
choices of these books. That imposes a significant responsibility
on these authors, for constitutional law casebooks are unusually,
perhaps uniquely, influential in the formation of students' values
about the appropriate roles of governmental institutions in a
constitutional democracy.
This transmission of values has a serious impact on the way
our society governs itself. We have long since ceased living in
an era in which Presidents appoint Justices who became lawyers
throu~h apprenticeship rather than through formalized law
study. Rather, our judges, and the lawyers who make constitutional arguments to them, form their constitutional values in the
legal culture that prevails in the law schools. Today, it is the
course in constitutional law that begins to prepare future judges
3. Camps Newfound/Owatonnia, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
4. On federalism, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. a. 1114
(1996); Printz v. United States, 117 S. a. 2365 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997). On racial preferences, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. a.
2097 (1995). On voting rights, see the line of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993), and continuing through Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
5. Justice Robert Jackson, appointed in 1941, was the last Justice who received
the bulk of his legal training through apprenticeship. See Eugene C. Gerhart, America's
Advocate: Robert H. Jackson 34-35 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).
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for what Justice Holmes called "the gravest and most delicate
duty (they are] called upon to perform"6 -deciding whether to
invalidate the product of the democratic process on constitutional grounds.
So the materials to which one is exposed in constitutional
law, and the habits of constitutional mind that are developed (in
part) as a result, have an impact not only on the practice of constitutional law, but also on the legal profession and our public
life generally. For many, the basic course in constitutional law
will amount to the sum total of their training in the field. Although some law students will have studied American government and constitutional theory at sophisticated levels, most will
have not. And although some will have studied constitutional
law in some other forum (usually an undergraduate political science course), again most will have not. Moreover, although law
schools commonly offer advanced courses in constitutional law
(most often, I imagine, first amendment courses), by no mean all
students partake of such offerings. Thus, the basic law school
course in constitutional law will be the beginning and, for many,
the end of our students' exposure to constitutional law and theory.
In this essay, I will examine some ways in which these casebooks (which I will refer to as Stone and Gunther & Sullivan,
respectively, with apologies to the unmentioned co-authors7)
will inculcate ways of thinking about constitutional law and particularly the role of the Supreme Court of the United States in
our constitutional order. Both books are monumental works of
scholarship that reflect lifetimes of thinking and reading by their
6. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927).
7. Professor Sullivan's addition as Professor Gunther's co-author merits some
comment, because it is a significant event. She now has the responsibility for carrying
on the tradition of one of the classic works of American legal scholarship, which Professor Gunther's book undoubtedly is. (In the interest of giving due respect to the past, it is
worth noting that Professor Gunther's book was a successor to a series begun by Professor Noel Dowling, a debt that Gunther has acknowledged. See Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law xvii-xviii (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 1975)). One cannot identify, of
course, Professor Sullivan's particular contributions to the book, but it is worth noting
that the most significant changes from the twelfth to the thirteenth editions-for example, moving the materials on justiciability from the last chapter to the first and substantially reorganizing them-are significant improvements. Another example is Chapters
12 and 13, which flesh out in great detail the particulars of free speech doctrine. While
Chapter 11, the first of the three free speech chapters, is quite similar to prior editions,
the subsequent two chapters represent a significant rewriting and reorganization of the
materials. In particular, the sections on "Money and Political Campaigns," (pp. 14001420) and on "New Media: Cable Television and the Internet," (pp. 1455-1461) are substantially new and tightly written and organized.
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distinguished authors. It would be surprising if their views did
not affect the presentation of the materials to the students. That
is, of course, inevitable and unobjectionable. Choices about
what cases to include and how to edit them will have a huge impact on the values that students take with them into the legal
profession. And the organizational choices-how the authors
arrange the materials that they have chosen-will as well.
It would be impractical to attempt a full canvassing of the
ways in which the casebooks perform their function of inculcating constitutional values. I will therefore focus on the choices
made in Stone and Gunther & Sullivan in just a few areas. I will
examine how Gunther & Sullivan's organization of the materials
on justiciability and equal protection will affect how students
will learn to think about constitutional law. With respect to
Stone, my focus is on the general pedagogic structure of the
book as a whole and the impact that it will have on how and
what students learn. I also will examine in some depth-using
the example of the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Case/- how editing choices within
the cases that Stone includes will affect what students know, in
addition to how they think.
I

I will begin with Gunther & Sullivan. The strengths that
have helped the book achieve such prominence in the past remain in the new edition. Above all, this casebook has always
been an unsurpassed collection of legal materials. The thirteenth, as in past editions, chooses the correct main cases and
edits them judiciously. That is no small feat. Due to the sheer
volume of cases to be dealt with and the Supreme Court's loquaciousness, casebook editors must be ruthless in cutting the
cases down to manageable size. Gunther & Sullivan performs
that task admirably, and also manages to retain the flavor and
character of the opinions. If one contrasts, for example, Gunther & Sullivan's edit of Justice Robert Jackson's famous con9
currence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, with the
version in other major casebooks, it is apparent just how skillful
Gunther & Sullivan is in providing a compact, yet nonetheless

8. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (reprinted in part in Gunther & Sullivan at p. 356 (cited in
note 1)).
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comprehensive, excerpt; the book retains just enough of the
cases, but not too much.
In my judgment, though, what made prior editions of Gunther so extraordinary-a feature that is retained in Gunther &
Sullivan-is the textual discussions of the doctrinal developments that led up to the main cases and of the developments
that followed them. Constitutional decisions are not, and should
not be, disconnected from what came before. They build upon
political, legal, and judicial traditions. The further that constitutional decision-making is removed from its historical context,
the greater the danger becomes that the law will be reduced to
the preferences of judges. Gunther & Sullivan describes and
synthesizes the materials in a way that enables students to understand them in their own right and, just as important, to place
them in their historical context.
Consider Gunther & Sullivan's handling of the law of economic substantive due process. In just a few pages, (pp. 454460) Gunther & Sullivan explains the development of the law
from the time of Calder v. Bull through Lochner; in a few more
pages, (pp. 465-470) the book then explores the range of possible theoretical objections to (or defenses of) Lochner and its
style of constitutional reasoning; it then succinctly notes (pp.
470-474) the development of doctrine during the Lochner era up
to its New Deal repudiation; finally it details (pp. 476-486) the
post-New Deal abdication of any judicial scrutiny of economic
regulation, from Carolene Products through Williamson v. Lee
Optical and beyond. And all of this is done in a way that describes the doctrinal developments clearly and at the same time
raises the salient theoretical points. In about thirty elegant
pages, then, Gunther & Sullivan provides the materials for the
student to become literate in a major sequence of events in our
constitutional history, to think critically about the underlying issues, and also to learn the modem state of the law.
This is Gunther & Sullivan at its best, and it is largely unchanged from the twelfth edition. Besides updating doctrine,
though, the thirteenth edition makes some important changes.
For instance, in the twelfth edition the materials on justiciability-those dealing with advisory opinions, ripeness, standing,
mootness, and political questions-were literally an afterthought, coming in the final chapter of the book. In the new edition, those materials have been integrated into Chapter 1, which
presents the materials on the establishment of the judicial power
and then explores its limits. The change is a good one, and the
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reasons why involve the messages the book sends to students
through its editing and organization. The placement of the justiciability materials at the end of the book, and by implication of
the constitutional law course (if they are taught at all}, spoke
volumes, however subtly, about their importance. 10
Under the twelfth edition's organization, by the time the
student came to justiciability, he or she had spent weeks, and
some 1000 pages, learning about the important role of the Supreme Court in protecting due process rights, ensuring the equal
protection of the laws, and policing the freedom of speech. At
that point, it would not have been surprising if that student was
unimpressed by, not to mention uninterested in, a study of the
circumstances in which Article III gives- or, horrors, might not
give- the Court the power to do all these good things. By contrast, placing the materials immediately after Marbury, which
the thirteenth edition does, 11 signals that they are important, indeed central, to what the judicial power is all about.
The law of justiciability is the most important structural
check that the Constitution imposes on the judiciary. 12 Article
III gives the Supreme Court (and the lower courts that Congress
sees fit to establish) the power to decide cases, and Marbury established that in the course of exercising that function the Court
necessarily has the power, indeed the obligation if the occasion
should arise, to declare acts of the coordinate departments unconstitutional. But Article III itself significantly constrains the
Court in exercising the power: The invocation of the power of
judicial review is justified only by the need to decide the rights
of individuals who have a distinct and palpable injury that implicates a legally-protected right. In short, it requires a case or
controversy.13
All of this is basic, even simple, to any teacher of constitutional law. Not so for students, who do not come to the subject
10. Like Gunther & Sullivan, Stone includes the justiciability materials in its first
chapter. See Stone at 88-145 (cited in note 1).
11. The first main case following Marbury deals with the law of standing. Gunther
& Sullivan at 30 (cited in note 1) (reprinting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
12. If you doubt this, consider either how blunt the other checks are (e.g., political
control through the nomination and confirmation process), or how infrequently they are
used (e.g., constitutional amendment or jurisdiction stripping).
13. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983). There is, of course, an extensive literature on this question. My purpose is not to defend here the outcome of any
particular standing case, but simply to point out the fact that the doctrine of standing, as
a subset of the justiciability rules, operates as a check on the Court. Whether and to
what degree that is a good or bad thing is a different question.
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with Article III as the first of their concerns. Unless these materials are at least introduced in the basic constitutional law
course, students will not understand the importance of justiciability doctrines and their centrality to the place of judicial review in our constitutional system. And students who learn this
at the beginning, when they learn about the other checks on the
Court (for example, jurisdiction stripping), will have a different
conception of the Supreme Court's role than will students who
1
learn this at the end.
The inclusion of the justiciability materials at the beginning
of Gunther & Sullivan, moreover, only builds upon one of the
strongest features of prior editions. In the past, the first chapter
of Gunther effectively laid out the development of the law of
judicial review, while at the same time exposing the tensions and
difficulties in analyzing the proper scope of judicial power and
of the Supreme Court's role. Gunther & Sullivan retains that
strength; after the materials devoted to the establishment of the
power of judicial review, (pp. 2-27) it leads the student through
an exploration of the checks that the constitutional structure
imposes on the Court in the exercise of that power. In particular, the materials on "The Authoritativeness of Supreme Court
Decisions," which include (pp. 20-25) an excellent and illuminating series of quotations from the most admired of our Presidents challenging the notion that the Supreme Court's role in
constitutional interpretation is exclusive, demand that students
question their common instinct that the Supreme Court is the
only, or even primary, institution with the power and responsibility to safeguard our constitutional liberties. 15 Precisely because it now includes the justiciability materials, Gunther &
Sullivan goes even further than prior editions in emphasizing the
importance of the limits on the Supreme Court's power.

14. It is worth noting that the justiciability materials in Gunther & Sullivan have
been considerably condensed from the twelfth edition. For example, in the twelfth edition, see Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1600-10 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991),
the problem of taxpayer standing led off the standing materials and occupied over 10
pages, whereas Gunther & Sullivan limits (pp. 37-38) those materials to a page-long textual note. The deemphasis of cases such as Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), is accompanied by an emphasis on more recent
developments. The inclusion in Gunther & Sullivan (pp. 38-43) of Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), as a main case was a wise choice, given its emphasis on the
Article III nature of standing.
15. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case Western L. Rev. 905
(1989-90); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L. J. 217 (1994).
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Other significant choices made by Gunther & Sullivan will
have an impact on the student's thinking about fundamental
questions. The Court's recent cases involving the law of federalism might well turn out to reflect a fundamental rethinking of
the law of state-federal relations, 16 a development that Gunther
& Sullivan terms an "antifederalist revival." (p. 113) Emphasizing the significance of this development, the book includes
(pp. 113-140) an extended treatment of U.S. Term Limits v.
Thornton. 17 Not only does the book devote many pages to the
term limits issue, but it does so immediately after the materials
dealing with McCulloch v. Maryland and its inauguration of the
constitutional tradition of expansively construing the scope of
federal powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause and narrowly interpreting the powers of the States to act upon the federal government.
Although U.S. Term Limits in one sense is the exception to
the rule of the Court's recent federalism cases-its holding was
that the States have no power to impose term limits on federal
legislators-the debate on the Court was explicitly over the fundamentals of federalism. Was the formation of the Union the
act of the States or only of the people? Did the reserved powers
of the States encompass acts that might affect the newly formed
federal government? What substance should be given to the default position that the States have power (if their domestic law
gives it to them) unless something in the Constitution specifically divests them of it? Did the reserved powers of the States
by definition fail to include anything concerning relations with
the federal government, as McCulloch seemed to hold? Gunther & Sullivan's juxtaposition of the debate in U.S. Term Limits
with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch is striking.
Until very recently, it had been generations since the issues at
stake in McCulloch had any substantial real world doctrinal
relevance. Notwithstanding the result in U.S. Term Limits, the
debate in that case, along with the Court's other recent federalism holdings, shows that those issues are once again on the table.
In emphasizing these materials, and particularly in contrasting
them with McCulloch, Gunther & Sullivan indicates to students
their historical importance as well as their centrality to the recently-renewed struggle on the Court over fundamental questions of federal versus state power. This is an excellent example
of the casebook bringing to the fore current issues while none16. See the federalism cases cited in note 4.
17. 514 u.s. 779 (1995).
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theless ensuring that they are placed in the context of prior history and doctrine.
I have detailed some ways in which Gunther & Sullivan's
organization will necessarily affect habits of thinking that students develop. The book will affect how students think in any
number of additional ways, of course, and I will just mention a
few others. As a general matter, the book is not one that goes
out its way to push the views of Professor Gunther or Professor
Sullivan. The sympathies of the authors are nonetheless apparent. For example, one cannot get through the equal protection
materials (Chapter 9) without repeatedly confronting Professor
Gunther's theory of the "newer" equal protection, which can be
colloquially summed up as a rational basis approach with
"bite. " 18 An excerpt from Professor Gunther's famous article
leads off (pp. 630-632) the equal protection chapter, and the materials later include (pp. 646-647) an explanation and defense of
his argument-that even within the lowest, most deferential, tier
of equal protection scrutiny the Court ought to require the government to defend its classifications based upon a genuine connection between the means and ends that it seeks to pursue
rather than relying on the Court to conjure up a hypothetical rationale.
The degree to which the Court's doctrine justifies the attention Gunther & Sullivan gives to Professor Gunther's approach
is disputable. On the one hand, where classifications dealing
with economic matters are at stake, the Court continues to be
extremely deferential; laws appearing to make irrational classifications are routinely upheld, with the Court rejecting outright
the notion that legislatures are bound to justify their enactments
with any real showing of a connection between means and
19
ends. On the other hand, where different sorts of interests are
at stake, but not ones that the Court can bring itself to exalt with
the status of "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classifications, the
Court has been willing to step in and invalidate distinctions as
irrational. The two most salient examples are Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,'20 and Romer v. Evans. 21 In the first,
18. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Coun: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972). According to
Gunther & Sullivan's Table of Authorities, (pp. Ixxx-Ixxxi) there are 12 references to
this article in the book, which makes it the second most cited source in the book. (John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard U. Press, 1980), is first, with 14 citations.)
19. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993); U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
20. 473 u.s. 432 (1985).

170

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol.15:161

the Court struck down a requirement that a group home for
mentally retarded persons obtain a special zoning permit while
exempting from the permit requirement other group housing arrangements. In the latter, the Court struck down Colorado's
Amendment 2, the state referendum dealing with the status of
homosexuals under state law. 22 In neither case, however, was
the Court willing to admit that the level or nature of scrutiny it
was employing was any different from traditional rationality review, under which any conceivable justification will sustain the
law. But neither requirement would have been invalid if the
Court had consistently applied the deferential standard of rationality review. 23 Cases like Cleburne and Romer thus suggest
the continued possibility that the Court might someday adopt as
a general matter Professor Gunther's prescription of rational
basis review with bite. It is not surprising, then, that Gunther &
Sullivan notes the connection between Professor Gunther's
equal protection theory and Romer (p. 631 n.5), and that it discusses in some detail the possible inconsistency between traditional rational basis scrutiny and the analysis in Cleburne and
Romer. (pp. 746-747)
The authors' sensibilities are particularly revealed in their
note discussion of Romer. Gunther & Sullivan seems to recognize how uneasily the case fits into the fabric of prior law, questioning the lack of substance in the Court's claim that it was
truly applying rational basis review and asking rhetorically how
the Court's failure to distinguish or even cite Bowers v. Hardwick24 can be explained. (p. 746) The authors even go so far as
to allow that Justice Scalia's dissent might have some "logical
21. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
22. In Romer the Court adopted, at least in major part, an argument presented in
an amicus brief that Amendment 2 violated equal protection "on its face," because it
irrationally set apart a class of citizens as beyond the protection of the law. Two of the
named amici were Professor Gunther and Professor Sullivan. See Brief of Laurence H.
Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as
Amici Curiae In Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No.
94-1039).
23. The Court easily could have imagined rationales to sustain the provisions at
stake in Cleburne and Romer, as the dissenting opinions in the cases were quick to point
out. Justice Marshall lamented in Cleburne the Court's "refusal to acknowledge that
something more than minimum rationality review [was] at work." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
459 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia argued in Romer that there "obviously" was a legitimate rational basis to support
the referendum at issue. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at
1631-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering rationales to support the constitutionality of
Amendment 2).
24. 478 U.S. 186 (1985) (upholding as consistent with due process Georgia's antisodomy Jaw insofar as it applies to homosexual behavior).
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merit." 25 (p. 747) But having acknowledged, if only obliquely,
the shortcomings in the Court's reasoning, Gunther & Sullivan
immediately launches into a note suggesting "Alternative justifications for Romer." (I d.)
It is one traditional function of casebook note discussions to
raise the possibility of alternative rationales that might support
the result of a case, even if its reasoning is inadequate. With respect-to Romer, however, Gunther & Sullivan immediately leads
students to consider how that might be so without even pausing
to consider as an alternative that the case is simply wrong. Indeed, apart from some questioning of the Court's reasoning,
Gunther & Sullivan does not even pursue this latter possibility.
The book instead deals with the shortcomings of the Court's
opinion only by offering alternative rationales in support of the
same result.
In the wake of Romer commentators quickly offered arguments to justify the case's outcome. 26 That was, of course, neither surprising nor troubling. It is disquieting, however, for a
casebook to lead students to think about a controversial issue in
a particular way without seriously considering the alternatives.
Moreover, Gunther & Sullivan's discussion of Romer indicates
that it was something of a strain for the book not to suggest to
students that Romer was wrongly decided. In discussing the alternative justifications that have been offered to overcome what
it terms "defects in [Romer's] technical analysis," Gunther &
Sullivan includes a quote from Professor Sunstein suggesting
that the opinion's inadequacies "may actually be a virtue," because "[a]n adequate treatment would have required the Court
to write with a breadth and a depth that could not easily have
commanded a majority opinion." (p. 747) In light of the opinion's "technical defects" and the difficulty of writing an
"adequate treatment" of the problem that would gamer five
25. The book asks the students to consider this possibility, but only after admonishing them to leave aside the "most acerbic passages" in Justice Scalia's dissent. Gunther & Sullivan at 747 (cited in note 1).
26. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna M. Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const.
Comm. 257 (1996) (arguing that Romer was correctly decided on a theory much like the
Court's); Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 Mich.
L. Rev. 203 (1996) (arguing that Amendment 2 was an unconstitutional bill of attainder). Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Correspondence, Is Amendment 2 Really A Bill of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis of Romer, 95 Mich. L. Rev.
(1996) (arguing that Amar's attainder analysis is incorrect and defending the Court's
result). But cf. Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulterkampf: Supreme Coun Storytelling, the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 345 (1997)
(arguing that Romer is wrongly decided).
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votes, one might have thought that Gunther & Sullivan would
have at least raised the possibility that the case was wrongly decided. Students ought to be challenged to consider both sides of
difficult constitutional questions, and a casebook's pedagogical
value is reduced when it fails to do so. Gunther & Sullivan's
treatment of Romer is one of the few times that the book falls
short in this respect.
II

Although Stone is generally organized as constitutional law
casebooks traditionally are, 27 its content is far different from
most, and certainly from Gunther & Sullivan. Just as Gunther
& Sullivan is unsurpassed as a collection of legal materials,
Stone is unsurpassed as a collection of interdisciplinary materials. It intersperses among the cases excerpts from scholarly materials bringing the insights of political science, philosophy, economics, and history to bear upon constitutional law. Of course,
most casebooks, including Gunther & Sullivan, also refer to
sources in addition to cases. But Stone is different in its emphasis on such materials, and in its inclusion of extensive quotations
from sources ranging from the Federalist Papers and the views
of the anti-federalists, to Bork and Bickel, to critical race theorists and modem republican revivalists. The amount of reading
and scholarship that Stone reflects, and the masterful job it does
of weaving choice excerpts from the literature into the discussion between cases, is simply staggering. While Gunther & Sullivan mainly refers the reader to such secondary sources (and to
fewer of them), Stone exposes the reader to the words of those
who have thought and written about constitutional law and theory from the time of the founding through today.
Stone's focus on materials apart from the cases is both good
and bad. It is good in that it forces students to confront the vast
theory beneath the surface of virtually every area of constitutional doctrine. Literally from its first page, the .book exposes
students to the political theory and history of the founding,
which is a valuable service to those who come to constitutional
law untrained in those disciplines. The book begins with a note
discussion of the political circumstances in the country under the
Articles of Confederation and of the forces that led to the call27. See William P. Marshall, An Advance in Tradition, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1508
(1986) (reviewing first edition of Stone and noting that, although its organization was by
and large traditional, it differed from the norm in significant ways).
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ing of the Philadelphia convention. (pp. 1-5) It then moves to a
discussion of the competing political philosophies of the antifederalists and the federalists, (pp. 5-12) and includes extensive
excerpts from Federalist No. 10 and No. 51. (pp. 8-17) It explains the republicanism of the founding, (pp. 12-14, 18-20) and
introduces the continuing influence of neo-republicanism on
contemporary constitutional theory. (pp. 20-23)
Only then does the book bring Marbury v. Madison on the
scene. (pp. 23-31) The differing organizational strategies of
Stone and Gunther & Sullivan at their respective beginnings
perhaps best exemplifies the differences between the two books.
Whereas Stone provides an extensive and rich introduction to
the political theory of the founding before it even thinks about
the law, Gunther & Sullivan launches straight into Marbury.
Given the likelihood that many students will be unsophisticated
in the ways of American political theory, Stone's choice will
make it more likely that students will be better equipped from
the beginning of the course to engage in critical analysis of what
is at stake in questions of judicial power and the role of the Supreme Court in American government.
The cost of Stone's heavy emphasis on secondary sources is
that it threatens to overwhelm students, as well as their teachers.
The book asks its reader to do an unrealistic amount of reading
and thinking about the law and the commentary on it. At the
same time that it includes encyclopedic references to the secondary literature, Stone does not slight the law-excerpts from or
references to all the cases are there. For instance, the almostfifty pages (pp. 697-743) of equal protection materials relating to
sex-based classifications are divided almost equally between
case excerpts and secondary materials. The notes and questions
in those materials, like the notes and questions throughout the
book, would take the most conscientious and perspicacious
teacher a huge amount of time to deal with coherently and fully.
A student would be swamped.
The pedagogical difficulties created by this are significant.
While it might be true that "over-simplification is no service to
advanced students," 28 neither is it in their interest to be overwhelmed. (Not to mention the fact that many, if not most, students in basic constitutional law courses are in their first year of
law school.) Students who are unable to slog through the mate28. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Couns and the Federal
System xv (Foundation Press, 1st ed. 1953).
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rials with any confidence that they are making progress are
likely to become dispirited about the book and cynical about the
subject. Of course, instructors can (indeed, must) deal with this
problem by cutting and pasting in making assignments. But that
is not a costless solution. The instructor is likely going to feel
some pressure to address for himself or herself the unassigned
materials, even though his or her students are not required to
pay attention to them. And it interrupts the flow of the course if
the syllabus consists of jumps and starts throughout the materials. Incomplete coverage of the reading materials is inevitable
these days, given the sheer amount of law on the books and the
resultant size of casebooks. But Stone is unusual even among
modern constitutional law casebooks in the degree to which it
relies so heavily on selections from secondary sources in exploring the depths of the materials, and in the amount of materials that consequently cannot be covered.
29
If teachers must pick and choose what to cover, the necessity of doing so is particularly regrettable in the case of Stone,
since the materials that are likely not to be covered in most
courses are among the most original and interesting in the book.
Take, for example, the chapter on state action (Chapter X). It is
a systematic treatment, aimed at demonstrating that the choice
of baseline determines whether the law treats conduct as theresponsibility of the state. Sometimes our choice of baseline
makes the state responsible for what might seem like private
conduct,30 sometimes not. 31 Are the lines between public and
29. In some ways, it bears noting, Stone offers more flexibility to instructors than
Gunther & Sullivan. For example, an instructor wishing to emphasize the history of
slavery and reconstruction in teaching the materials on race would find much more extensive and rich materials in Stone. Stone provides (pp. 495·512) an extensive background note, a generous excerpt from the opinion in Dred Scott 11. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857), and a series of challenging notes and questions on the reconstruction
period and the legislative and judicial action that took place at the time. Stone then
covers P/essy, the Jim Crow period, and the legal attack on the separate but equal doctrine. (pp. 512-522) Only then does Stone turn to Brown /. (pp. 523-525) By contrast,
Gunther & Sullivan begins (pp. 663-664) its materials on race with a note on Strauder 11.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), and covers the entirety of the separate but equal era
in just a couple of pages of notes. (pp. 671-673) The only mention of Dred Scott in the
entire book is a one-sentence footnote description of its holding that the editors added
to their version of The Slaughter-House Cases. (p. 424 n.2) Gunther & Sullivan's
slighting of Dred Scott is a serious defect. That case merits a more extended treatment,
if only for its historical significance. For purposes of learning current doctrine and its
underlying theoretical tensions, Dred Scott is not commonly seen as essential. But see
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 Const. Comm.
37 (1993) (arguing that originalist constitutional interpretation would lead to the conclusion that Dred Scott was correctly decided).
30. See Shelley 11. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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private in this and other contexts in any sense neutral? Prepolitical? Even if they are not neutral or prepolitical, are they
nonetheless prescribed by (or traceable to) baselines contemplated when the Constitution and its amendments were drafted
and ratified? Throughout the book, but particularly in its last
chapter on state action, Stone raises these kinds of questions,
and self-consciously leads the reader to recognize that constitutional law frequently depends on choices between baselines.
That the book would inculcate this way of critical thinking
should come as no surprise, of course, since it is the common
thread that runs through much of the authors' other academic
work. 32 While the book does not deny the legitimacy of doctrine
that is grounded in the political choices reflected in the text or
history of the Constitution itself,33 it is fair to say that the book
thematically exposes the importance and contestability of the
baselines chosen in resolving constitutional questions. 34 Students who learn this way of thinking about constitutional law
will inevitably be suspicious of the status quo, particularly the
status quo imposed by our legal traditions, as having any claim
of constitutional legitimacy.
In addition to affecting how students think about constitutional law-what their baselines will be, in Stone's terms-a
casebook will determine what they know. Constitutional law
casebooks generally cover about the same doctrinal areas and
31. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189 (1989), noted and discussed in Stone at pp. 1701·03 (cited in note 1).
32. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1993 );
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987); Mark V. Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
Harv. L. Rev. 781 (1983); Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice:
The Uneasy Case fora Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 Yale L.
J. 1006 (1987); Louis Michael Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, "The Right to
Die," and the Pub lidPrivate Distinction, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47.
33. For example, the book's treatment of takings law allows that the Fifth
Amendment itself incorporated an explicit baseline in favor of protecting private property rights. (p. 1681) Of course, the text of the Takings Clause, see U.S. Const. amend.
V, can hardly be given any meaning without recognizing some priority for property
rights; so in that sense it poses an easy case for discerning, at least roughly, the constitutionally-imposed baseline.
34. For examples of this theme in addition to the state action materials in Chapter
X, see the equal protection materials on race and government motive, (pp. 613-631, 645648) on sex-based classifications, (pp. 721-730) and on wealth-based classifications; (pp.
759-765) the materials on implied fundamental rights, particularly those on economic
rights, (pp. 822-829) and on abortion funding; (pp. 974-978) the materials on defining
interests for purposes of procedural due process; (pp. 1053-1059) parts of the free speech
matenals; (pp. 1301-1323,1329-1334,1384-1386, 1417-1421) and the materials on takings
and the Contracts Clause. (pp. 1635-1645, 1660-1673, 1681-1692)
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include many of the same cases. 35 Perhaps because of its copious
use of secondary materials, however, Stone's editing of the traditional materials sometimes omits important discussions. If
language from a case is not included in a casebook, a student
will never know it is on the books unless he or she has reason to
read the case in the United States Reports. Such omissions are
important, for materials that are not covered can influence students just as much as those that are. Indeed, because students
will not have the chance to evaluate for themselves what they
never know exists, particular attention to what Stone leaves out
is warranted.
Consider Stone's treatment of Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 36 The book contains an extensive excerpt from the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter. 37 And well that it should, since Casey is
undoubtedly one of the most important cases decided by the
Court in modem times. Indeed, the book's excerpt of all the
opinions in Casey runs 26 pages-which ties for the longest case
in the entire volume. 38 Despite the length of the excerpt it includes, the edited version of Casey in Stone fails in important
ways to provide students with the tools for developing a full understanding of the joint opinion's explanation for why it was
necessa~ to retain what it termed the "central holding" of Roe
v. Wade, 9 and of the issues at stake in thinking about the problem of substantive due process generally. To see why that is so,
it is first necessary to describe in some detail the joint opinion's
analysis of why abortion must remain a constitutionallyprotected liberty.
In explaining and grounding the source of constitutional
protection for the decision to obtain an abortion, the joint
opinion speaks generally about the law of substantive due proc35. Neither Stone nor Gunther & Sullivan departs from the traditional coverage of
casebooks, although there are some unusual case-coverage choices in both. For example, in its freedom of speech materials, Gunther & Sullivan includes (pp. 1151-1155) as a
main case American Booksellers Assn, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), which struck down Indianapolis's anti-pornography ordinance. The choice to feature the case was a wise one, since that opinion is one of the
clearest and most persuasive renderings of traditional freedom of speech principles that
one can find. For another example, for its main preemption case, Stone includes (pp.
373-380) Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Assn., 505 U.S. 88 (1992). That case
merits just a brief note citation in most other constitutional law casebooks.
36. 505 u.s. 833 (1992).
37. Stone's excerpt of the joint opinion alone is a little more than 17 pages (pp.
990-1007).

38. With United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (pp. 154-180).
39. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
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ess; it endorses the Court's prior substantive due process jurisprudence40 and describes and defends its conception of how the
41
Court ought to make decisions in that line of cases. The joint
opinion frankly states that the protection of liberty in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a
"substantive component," including, but also going berond,
4
most of the rights protected by the first eight amendments. But
how are such substantive rights to be identified? The joint
opinion's answer is extremely significant to an understanding of
the law and the stakes in the continuing debate over the scope of
the law of substantive due process.
Among the passages left out of Stone are those in which the
joint opinion explains its methodology for identifying and defining the scope of substantive due process rights. Perhaps that
is because the joint opinion's exposition is itself so thin. Indeed,
the joint opinion admits that, in its conception of the law, it is
not possible to offer any general rule that can be applied from
case to case:
The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due
process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the
Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition
courts have always exercised: reasoned judgment. Its bounda43
ries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule.

In the very next sentence, though, the joint opinion's authors assure us that their mandate does not leave them "free to invalidate state policy choices with which (they] disagree." 44 Yet they
are also not "permit(ted] to shrink from the duties of (their] office."45
What content, though, does this concept of reasoned judgment have, other than not authorizing judges to impose their
value preferences while also not shrinking from the duties of
their office? The joint opinion turns to Justice Harlan, and offers an extended quote from his famous dissenting opinion in
46
Poe v. Ullman. Justice Harlan emphasized there his view that
40. With the notable exception of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), a case
seems not to fit easily with the joint opinion's conception of the scope of personal
hberty protected by due process. Justice O'Connor is the only Justice who was in the
majority in both Casey (on the question whether Roe should be retained) and Hardwick.
41. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-53 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.)
42. Id. at 846-49.
43. Id. at 849.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
~hich
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substantive due process analysis depended upon careful discernment of the "balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society." 47 That
balance, Justice Harlan said, "is the [one] struck by this country,
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from
which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke." 48
One would expect, then, the joint opinion to ground the
abortion liberty in a Harlanesque analysis of the traditions of
this country. What follows instead is a series of citations of the
Court's substantive due process cases relating to contraception
and the "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."49 Then the joint opinion synthesizes the Court's cases in
the following way:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
is the right to define one's own concept of existence!,o of meaning, of the universe and of the mystery of human life.

Remember that the authors of .the joint opinion earlier explicitly
invoked Justice Harlan's approach to deciding substantive due
process cases. It is plain, however, that Justice Harlan-who
was deeply concerned with the legitimacy of the Court's exercise
of the power to invalidate the product of the democratic lawmaking process-would not have conceived of his traditionbased analysis as embracing the unfocused, ahistorical slogan
that the state has no business meddling in how people define the
mystery of human life. 51 In contrast to Justice Harlan's focus on

47. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoted in Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (joint opinion)).
48. ld
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (quoting Prince v Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944)). The other cases cited at this point in the Casey joint opinion are Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972). See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. In describing the development of the law of
substantive due process in the prior few pages, the joint opinion cites most of the leading
cases on the subject (again with the notable exception of Bowers v. Hardwick.) Id. at
846-50.
50. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
51. In Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan was clear about this point. He went out of his
way to state that the due process clause would not protect from state regulation in matters such as adultery, fornication and homosexual sex, precisely because the interest in
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societally-protected traditions, the joint opinion's analysis of
why a woman's liberty depends on the right to abortion focuses
entirely on the .importance of the decision whether to continue
52
the pregnancy to the particular woman. For the joint opinion,
the decision is so important that it is a basic requirement of justice, or ordered liberty if you will, that women make this choice
for themselves. What is more, the Constitution, through the
Due Process Clause, enshrines that principle of justice into
American law.
What will students using Stone learn about this crucial part
of constitutional law? What will they learn about the joint
opinion's treatment of the principles underlying the law of substantive due process, and about how to distinguish between conduct that is protected by the right to define the "mystery of human life" and conduct that is not?
The answer is that students will learn nothing about these
matters. None of the materials from Casey that I have quoted
are included in the edited version appearing in Stone. No frank
admission that it is "inescapable" that judges will decide these
cases by exercising "reasoned judgment." No "heart of liberty"
or "mystery of human life" passages. These are significant
omissions. Students who do not read these parts of the case will
not have a full appreciation of the debate over the scope of substantive due process. As a matter of theory, Stone's omission of
these passages relieves students from confronting the joint
opinion's admission that there are no external standards to constrain judicial action in this field other than a sense of reasoned
judgment. As a matter of doctrine, the mystel); passage has obvious implications for other claims of freedom. 3 To analyze the
legitimacy of the Court's methodology, students must be invited
to evaluate whether it has any meaningful content and limits,
and if so, what they are. But the student who is not aware of the
passage will never have the chance. 54
Stone also omits a telling portion of the Court's 1989 decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 55 -an omission that is related to
the Casey opinion's conception of substantive due process. The
protecting the sanctity of marital relationships justifies the regulation of non-marital
sexual conduct. 367 U.S. at 545-46.
52 Casey, 505 U.S. at 852-53.
53. See the discussion of the "right to die," at pp. 621-23.
54. It is worth noting that Gunther & Sullivan's edit of Casey includes the portions
that I have criticized Stone for leaving out. See Gunther & Sullivan at 559 (cited in note
1).

55.

491

u.s. 110 (1989).
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Court held in Michael H. that the putative father of a child conceived as the result of an adulterous relationship has no substantive due process right to have his parental interests recognized.
Beyond its holding, however, the case quickly gained attention
because of a debate between Justice Scalia, who wrote the plurality opinion, and Justice Brennan, who wrote the principal dissent, over the proper methodology for identifying substantive
rights protected by due process. Justice Scalia argued that substantive due process protected only those rights that have a
pedigree in the traditions of the nation, identified at the most
specific level of generality that is feasible. 56 Only through such a
methodology, he urged, can judges in such cases claim to be implementing societal values rather than their own. 57 Justice
Brennan, by contrast, argued that due process is about protecting the fundamental value of freedom, and that Justice Scalia's
reliance on history and tradition as a constraining force offered
illusory benefits since such concepts are just as manipulable as
an open reliance on value judgments.58 This debate was an unusual, and unusually frank, exchange over the issues at stake in
substantive due process analysis, and commentators soon
chimed in with their views. 59 Thus, it is no surprise that constitutional law casebooks, including Stone60 (and Gunther & Sullivan6), now feature the Michael H. debate between Justice Scalia
and Justice Brennan.
There was a concurring opinion in Michael H., however,
that should have attracted as much attention as the others. That
concurring opinion,62 authored by Justice O'Connor and joined
by Justice Kennedy, was portentous of the substantive due process analysis that was to come in Casey. In that concurrence, Justice O'Connor stated that although she agreed with (and therefore joined) most of Justice Scalia's opinion, she could not join
his footnote 6, which was the heart of his response to Justice
56. 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6.
57. ld
58. ld. at 137-41.
59. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution
(Harvard U. Press, 1991 ); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in
the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349 (1992); J. M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and
the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo. L. Rev. 1613 (1990); Note, Footnote 6: Justice
Scalia's Attempt to Impose A Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 Harv. J. L. &
Pub. Pol. 853 (1991).
60. Stone at 1025-27 (cited in note 1).
61. Gunther & Sullivan at 590-92 (cited in note 1).
62 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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Brennan's criticisms and of his position regarding the level of
generality at which societal traditions should be identified in
63
performing substantive due process analysis.
Her language
bears quoting. Justice Scalia's argument in footnote 6, she says:
sketches a mode of historical analysis ... [that] may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this area. On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be
'the most specific level' available. I would not foreclose the
unanticipated bX the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis. (citations omitted)

In light of this opinion it seems that Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy thought that Justice Scalia's footnote 6 was an inadequate response to Justice Brennan's dissent, at least if they
were to retain prior cases of which they approved (although they
failed to cite Roe v. Wade as one of those cases), and the flexibility to decide future cases as they saw fit. Yet they nonetheless voted with Justice Scalia and the majority and against the
dissent. It is remarkable that these Justices-the decisive votes
on substantive due process issues for a decade-contented
themselves with deciding the case by merely stating their disagreement with passages in Justice Scalia's opinion, while refusing to give any meaningful account of why they preferred the
majority's result rather than the dissent's.
Although Stone mentions (p. 1026) Justice O'Connor's Michael H. concurrence, it does not include any of its text. 65 The
text of that opinion is significant, however, especially in light of
what happened three years later in Casey. The views as expressed in Michael H. and the joint opinion in Casey must be
confronted by students seeking a full understanding of the development of the law of substantive due process and the underlying theoretical issues. Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy
might be correct in their view that judges ought not to
"foreclose the unanticipated" by binding themselves to follow a
consistent historical approach from case to case; perhaps it is
right that judges properly exercise the capacity of "reasoned
judgment" in this field. Students using Stone, however, will not
63. Id.
64. Id. The block quote in the text contains virtually the entirety of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence; the ellipses represent citations of the Court's leading substantive due process cases and nothing more.
65. Again, in contrast to Stone, Gunther & Sullivan includes (p. 591) the bulk of
the text of Justice O'Connor's concurrence.
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even know exactly where these Justices stand. And they will not
be forced to think hard about whether the joint opinion's approach is sustainable.
The failure to include the crucial portions of the Casey joint
opinion or any portions of the Michael H. also renders students
using Stone less able to deal with subsequent doctrinal developments. That is particularly so in thinking about the so-called
"right to die." In Washington v. Glucksberg66 and Vacco v.
67
Quil/, the Supreme Court recently rejected the claim that due
process confers upon individuals any broad right to physicianassisted suicide. 68 The lower court in Glucksberg had concluded
that due process confers a right upon the terminally ill to choose
the circumstances of their deaths. It was not surprising that its
reasoning rested squarely on Casey's discussion of the heart of
liberty. The Ninth Circuit referred to Casey as "a powerful
precedent," which had as its "fundamental message" the lesson
that '"matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. "' 69 The Ninth Circuit surveyed the law
of substantive due process and concluded that it was properly
distilled to a legal principle represented by the mystery passage
from Casey. 70 That conclusion was entirely consistent with what
seemed to be the views of the joint opinion's authors on the
same question; after all, the paragraph culminating in the mystery passage was itself precisely a distillation of legal principle
from the Court's prior cases. In short, if one reads the mystery
passage for all it is worth, as the Ninth Circuit did, it is by no
means unreasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court's abor66. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
67. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
68. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
69. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 801 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane)
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
70. Id at 813-14. The Ninth Circuit was not alone in so reading Casey. Several of
the most eminent English-speaking philosophers in the world submitted an amicus brief
to the Supreme Court endorsing the Ninth Circuit's analysis and the correctness of the
Casey mystery passage. See Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick,
John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thompson as Amici Curiae In Support
of Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. a. 2258 (1997) (No. 95-1858) &
Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. a. 2293 (1997) (No. 96-110). As it turns out, the Supreme Court
disagreed, stating that the Casey statement in effect did not mean everything it appeared
to say; according to the G/ucksberg Court, although Casey spoke in terms of personal
autonomy as an end to be protected by due process, it just so happens that the values
protected by due process-matters involving marriage, child bearing, child rearinginvolve elements of autonomy as well. See G/ucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2270-71. (The Supreme Court did not cite the philosophers' brief.)
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tion jurisprudence dictates the recognition of a broad right to
determine how and when one dies. Again, though, the student
using Stone will be ignorant of the crucial passages from Casey
and therefore less able to evaluate whether the Court's cases
properly encompass such a right.
What is to explain these omissions in Stone? There is no
way to say, of course, for there is no source to which we can turn
for an explanation of the authors' editing decisions, particularly
those to omit portions of decisions. The simplest explanation is
just that something (indeed, a whole lot) had to go. The Casey
decision runs over 175 pages in the United States Reports, and
even the most generous casebook version of it cannot come
close to providing a complete rendition of the opinions in the
case. And I suppose it would not be difficult to identify significant omissions from many other important cases, both in Stone
and in other casebooks.
Upon reading the full text of the joint opinion, though, it is
hard to miss the unusual significance of the portions on which I
have focused. It was not difficult to see that those parts of the
joint opinion would affect the terms of the debate on future doctrinal developments in the law not only of abortion but of substantive due process generally. It was no accident that the lower
courts in Glucksberg regarded the mystery passage in Casey as
"almost prescriptive" of a broad right to physician-assisted suicide.71 Although space is surely at a premium, even in a 1750page casebook, Stone's authors would serve the book's users by
providing a fuller version of Casey in the fourth edition.
III
Both Gunther & Sullivan and Stone are great works of synthesis and scholarship. Both achieve virtually encyclopedic coverage of constitutional law, while also exposing the theoretical
issues that underlie the every part of the field. They surely deserve the prominence they have achieved. Yet even with books
as prominent and important as these-perhaps especially with
such books-we must nonetheless be attentive to what materials
are included, and how they are edited and organized. Decisions
about those matters will, after all, go a long way toward inculcating the constitutional values of the next generation.
71. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 801 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Wash·
ington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash. 1994)).

